MONTREAL — A new provincial political party courting Quebec anglophones, minorities and federalists arrived on the scene Tuesday — the second in less than a week.
The Canadian Party of Quebec describes itself as “a progressive, rights-centred, federalist option.”
Spokesman Colin Standish says the fledgling party is preparing its paperwork for Élections Québec and will introduce its logo and leader in the coming weeks. The party, he says, is committed to being a provincewide movement, although he adds it expects to draw its core support from English-speaking Quebecers and minority groups.
“Certainly we have a 125-riding strategy,” Standish said in an interview Tuesday, referencing Quebec’s 125-seat legislature. “We see this as a provincewide movement that can potentially appeal to all Quebecers, not just English speakers, but French speakers, the Indigenous community and newcomers.
“We do recognize our core constituencies — English speakers and minority groups — are concentrated in areas in Montreal, the Eastern Townships and western Quebec, and we’ll be paying particular focus to targeted ridings.”
It’s the second party focused on anglophones and minorities to launch ahead of the Oct. 3 provincial election. Failed Montreal mayoral candidate Balarama Holness last week announced his new party, Mouvement Québec, would also advocate for ethnic and linguistic minorities, particularly in Liberal party strongholds in Montreal.
Liberal Leader Dominique Anglade, whose party’s traditional voter base includes those English and minority communities, says she’s confident voters will ultimately see the Liberals as the best option.
“The Liberal party is the largest tent that there is to support all Quebecers; it doesn’t matter where they come from,” Anglade told reporters Tuesday in Montreal.
For his part, Standish dismissed the notion his party will split the vote among anglophone federalists and minority voters, arguing that more parties and more voices at the ballot box can’t be a bad thing.
“No vote in Quebec can be taken for granted and no political party has a monopoly on a certain riding, a certain group of people or forming government,” Standish said.
Asked about the two potential new parties, François Legault said they both seemed to be advocating in favour of a bilingual Quebec, which he said would spell the end of the French language.
“If Quebec is bilingual, unfortunately the attraction in North America to English will be so strong, it will be a matter of time before we don’t speak French in Quebec and we become Louisiana,” Legault said in Quebec City.
This report by The Canadian Press was first published April 26, 2022.
— With files from Pierre Saint-Arnaud.
Sidhartha Banerjee, The Canadian Press
Did Elites Really Take Over Identity Politics? – Jacobin magazine
Across the political spectrum, it has become difficult to engage in any discussion without running into the subject of identity politics. Its definition and its value — progressive force or enemy of egalitarianism — are hotly contested. What were previously niche academic debates have now become mainstream talking points. Somehow millions now seem to have a view on critical race theory, wokeness, and the 1619 Project.
Elite Capture: How the Powerful Took Over Identity Politics (and Everything Else) by Olúfémi Táíwò, a political philosopher at Georgetown University, is his second book-length intervention in these debates. The first, Reconsidering Reparations, published by Oxford University Press in January, provided a sweeping defense of reparations, reinterpreted as climate justice. Working within the tradition of liberal political philosophy, Táíwò advanced a critique of liberalism’s nationalistic assumptions.
By focusing on distributive justice within idealized closed communities, theorists working within the tradition of the American political philosopher John Rawls fail to think globally about the relationship between nation-states and historically about the causes of inequalities, Táíwò argued. The result of this shortsightedness is that Rawlsianism is incapable of developing a theory of justice that seeks to address historical wrongdoing across borders. As an alternative, Táíwò proposed what he termed a “constructive” theory of reparations, the aim of which was to organize a political project seeking to create a more just world order rather than simply distribute cash or goods to victims of oppression. An attentive look at history, he showed, reveals a picture too complex for identarian blame games. The most urgent goal of this project is nothing less than a global coordinated response to climate change, targeting the world’s poorest nations.
Unlike mainstream philosophy, largely bogged down in provincial puzzles, Táíwò’s work has always been characterized by an engagement with history and the social sciences. Though idiosyncratic and selective in its focus, his attention to postcolonial movements has put some meat on what are often abstract discussions about concepts like justice. The aim of Reconsidering Reparations is constructive — offering an account of what Táíwò calls a world-making project. In his second book, Táíwò attempts to outline the practical hurdles to accomplishing this task.
Táíwò’s chief explanation for the weakness of coalitions in favor of redistribution and against oppression is what he calls elite capture. The generality of this term is, in his view, its strength. Where Táíwò seeks to distinguish his essay from previous criticisms of identity politics is by attempting to show that the supposed conservative turn in identity politics is not unique to it but rather a subspecies of a more general phenomenon. This is a compelling line of argument. But Elite Capture does not deliver on its promise. Instead, Táíwò’s essay describes a series of problems without providing a plausible explanation of their cause.
Who Are the Elites?
Divided into five sections, Elite Capture outlines its title concept and then attempts to apply it to a series of cases — focusing largely on weaponization of marginal status by certain identarians. At the heart of the book are three chapters, all structured around an architectural metaphor: “Reading the Room,” “Being in the Room,” “Building a New House.” In these sections he applies a conceptual framework largely taken from the philosophy of language, which sees social structures as governed by rules of communication, to the institutions that he sees as falling victim to elite capture.
Whereas mainstream liberal understandings of social structures interpret society as, to quote Rawls, a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage,” Táíwò’s more critical variant recognizes that societies structured around relations of oppression are anything but. In this respect, his work develops on a line of argument advanced most notably by the late Charles Mills, a former Marxist who felt that liberalism offered better resources for addressing racialized and gendered forms of oppression than his old ideology. Similarly, Táíwò’s aim is “to change the common ground — to change what information [is] usable by people in their daily interactions.”
His understanding of this common ground or social system is decidedly vague; so too is his conception of an elite. The latter he defines as a small group of people who have power over a larger group. Crucial to this definition is that the concept of an elite is nonessentialist: there is nothing about a specific racial or ethnic group that classifies it as an elite. This is a good corrective to the excesses of identity politics, which encourage an obsession with combating the dangers of “whiteness” and men, heterosexual or otherwise. It is, nevertheless, hard to avoid asking the question: Where does this broad notion of an elite leave the Marxist definition of capitalists, defined by control over the means of production?
In providing an account of elite capture, Táíwò relies on a number of theoretical approaches, some of which are liberal and others Marxist. Undoubtedly, pluralism can be a virtue, but it is unclear exactly in what mechanism he locates the cause of elite capture.
Is it, as Wolfgang Streeck, who he makes references to suggests, that decades of slow growth have hollowed out the capacity of liberal states, providing them with no means of ensuring profitability to capitalists other than by directly distributing resources to them via tax cuts and other forms of corporate welfare? Is elite capture a contingent phenomenon, resulting from the continued existence of predemocratic institutions within democratic states who seize power during moments of crisis, as another of Táíwò’s sources suggests? Is elite capture another term for antidemocratic tendencies and institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, which Táíwò blames for the indebtedness of nations in the Global South? Or is elite capture a cultural phenomenon, referring to the ways the formerly radical movements for queer or minority liberation have been defanged by conservatives?
Táíwò answer is, dubiously, all of the above. Elite capture is a general term that describes these disparate phenomena. Yet the effects of any of these processes would be felt so differently that comparison only serves to obscure what distinguishes the mechanisms underlying global stagnation or the continued existence of predemocratic institutions. The aim of social theory should be to home in on differences, producing as conceptually rich a picture of reality as possible, rather than to provide general terms for describing at times unrelated phenomena.
Carrying forward this nebulous definition of elite capture into the essay’s main sections, Táíwò then seeks to lay out tools that activists can use to check if elite capture is happening and to combat it. His arguments in these sections are informed by a combination of structuralism and voluntarism. In everything from social media to “capitalism” — understood as just another system among others — elites structure what is and is not acceptable to do or say. Táíwò makes this point through an extended “Emperor’s New Clothes” metaphor, where he tells us that “perhaps [the citizens can] see the emperor’s ass quite clearly — but change their behavior anyway because their livelihoods depend on it.” Similarly, social media influencers “structure which topics are trending” so that when “the rest of us make choices about what to watch or read or respond to, we’re mostly making choices in an environment shaped by elites.”
The idea here is that social interactions are organized around rules, similar to a game. “The game objective may be viscerally and irreducibly personal for each player,” Táíwò tells us; its goals may be “self-esteem, security, life itself — but the rules and the context that determine which actions make sense have been created by others who benefit from the outcome of those rigged systems.” Again, broadness of definition and generality of application make it difficult to assess the value of these insights. What is gained by comparing the “game” that social media users play for esteem with the “game” that workers “play” on entering the labor market?
Much of Táíwò’s discussion speaks to an activist milieu in which using perceived microaggressions as currency for social advantage has become an acceptable form of intraorganizational politics. Diplomatically, he seeks to disabuse his readers of the belief that they ought to kowtow to the platitudes built on standpoint epistemology. The theory, which draws attention to the subjective origin of knowledge claims, is one that Táíwò takes to be justified but often overextended.
Deference to perceived minorities or marginal groups can, Táíwò argues, serve to further social oppression. “Centering the most marginalized” in practice usually means “handing conversational authority” and what he, referring to esteem and recognition, strangely calls “attentional goods,” “to whoever is already in the room and appears to fit a social category associated with some form of oppression — regardless of what they have or have not actually experienced.”
These prescriptions serve as helpful guides for activists negotiating many left-wing spaces in which working-class members are few in number. Their primary aim is to draw the attention of “thought leaders” and “change makers” away from a politics that will further entrench the marginality of these organizations. The world of Elite Capture is, like our own, one in which the popular classes have been thoroughly expunged from the political stage. Subsequently, the task which Táíwò sets himself is to provide a way of pushing back against anti-majoritarian tendencies given this political climate. In this regard, Táíwò’s arguments are well taken and should prove useful to the social cohort to which they are directed, well-meaning activists easily led astray by the latest identarian fashions.
More broadly, however, one may wonder if the painstaking work of engaging with the misconceptions of identitarians is worth the effort. The pathologies of these forms of politics — well observed by Táíwò — result from their marginality. It is, as he makes clear, because these organizations do not have a foothold in any popular constituency that they allow themselves to be held hostage by deference politics and other elite fads. Without a proper analysis of the social and economic structures that have locked the working class out of power, Táíwò’s theory comes across as one-sided.
A tendency to flatten the differences between social structures, itself a hallmark of liberal political theory, runs through Táíwò’s essay. This explains why he can so easily jump from discussions of capitalism to discussions of systems of affirmation and recognition. Ontological pluralism of this kind is ill-suited to adjudicating which social structure has priority over another, a problem that comes to the fore when one enquires into the ultimate cause of elite capture.
The malleable understanding of social structures presumed throughout Táíwò’s analysis encourages the conclusion that bad decisions and choices on the part of individuals are to blame. Although reference is made to capitalism, Táíwò’s conception of agency relies on a view of constraining structures incompatible with the dull compulsion of the market. In the essay’s concluding sections he writes:
Creatures like us have a special power. Despite all our social programming, we can just do things. We can ignore the sidewalk and walk in the street; we can carry the bag with handles from its underside. We can do the thing that will be punished; we can ignore the potential reward, choose the smaller prize. Moreover, we can accept the rewards and the punishments without accepting the “lessons” they are meant to teach us about who and what is worthy. . . .
This power is one of the many that helps explain why our social systems are not fixed — even ones as complicated as our current global system of capitalism.
As with many of Táíwò’s claims, it is hard to disagree with them, made as they are at such a high level of abstraction.
Changing the Subject
More important, from the perspective of socialists today, is how to understand the emergence of the outlook and set of problems to which Táíwò wishes to respond. His own theory is too unreflexive to answer this question. This shortcoming is not a unique feature of his work. Over the past few years, a number of books have sought to figure out what’s wrong with, or what has happened to, identity politics.
Predominantly written by authors on the Left, these outpourings have all taken as their starting point a recognition of separate forms of oppression. Often, this position has been used to then problematize the assumptions of mainstream liberalism, as is the case in Táíwò’s work. However, the fact that this set of issues have come to concern the Left in the first place is worthy of explanation.
A plausible explanation of this phenomena is that politics, at least in the lifetime of most of the pro–Bernie Sanders left, has existed in conditions of economic stagnation after the end of what Adolph Reed has termed “growth liberalism.” Within the context of slow growth, the redistribution of an ever-increasing pie — the economic model on which social democracy was dependent — is harder for progressive forces to ensure. In place of a politics of growth-based redistribution, what exists is one concerned with the allocation of ever-decreasing resources to specific sections of society.
On the Right, attacks on citizenship, subsidies for unproductive small businesses, and tariffs, are policies created to direct resources to a Republican base without a growth model of its own. The Democrats have also advanced their own redistributive agenda, supporting a wave of neoliberal initiatives aimed at different parts of their voting base. Identity politics has come under criticism not because it is some key to unlocking a new socialist movement — as some of its more sanguine defenders allege — but because it has been the means through which the Democratic Party has sought to maintain its legitimacy.
In this context, the excesses of identity politics should not be understood, as Táíwò suggests, as an error in need of correction. A politics that seeks to redistribute resources and power to minority groups, defined in increasingly arbitrary ways, is a rational response to a world plagued by stagnation and the defeat of class solutions to social inequality. If there is no way to put out the fire inside of a burning house, the second-best thing to do is get out.
Yet there is still, though increasingly distant, hope for a different sort of politics. If socialist policies are able to put redistribution, spurred on by productive investment, back on the agenda, then the forms of identity politics that have come to dominate our politics may recede. This will at least give us something else to talk about, and a new, more promising battleground on which fight.
Trump's obsession with 2020 weighs on his political power — and his political future – CNN
(CNN)Fixated on relitigating the 2020 presidential election, former President Donald Trump has often argued since leaving office that Republicans cannot have a successful future — either at the ballot box or legislatively — if they turn a blind eye to the past.
Looking ahead to a potential run
Politics Briefing: Canada Soccer calls off Iran game after criticism over Flight PS752 – The Globe and Mail
Canada Soccer has cancelled a planned friendly with Iran in the face of growing criticism that included concerns raised by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.
In a one-paragraph statement issued on Thursday, the governing body gave no reason for the cancellation of the scheduled June 5 game at B.C. Place Stadium in Vancouver.
At issue is whether Canada should be hosting Iran given the Canadians who died on Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 when it was shot down on Jan. 8, 2020, minutes after taking off from Tehran, by an Iranian surface-to-air missile. The Canadian government says 55 Canadian citizens and 30 permanent residents were among the 176 people killed.
Mr. Trudeau has said the game “wasn’t a very good idea,” and suggested that it would be up to the Canada Border Services Agency whether the Iran team is allowed into the country. Conservative MPs also added their voices to the protest.
The Association of Families of Flight PS752 Victims called for Canada Soccer “to cancel the game immediately.”
There’s a full story here on the situation.
This is the daily Politics Briefing newsletter, written by Ian Bailey. It is available exclusively to our digital subscribers. If you’re reading this on the web, subscribers can sign up for the Politics newsletter and more than 20 others on our newsletter signup page. Have any feedback? Let us know what you think.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MAY PARTICIPATE IN COURT CHALLENGE OF QUEBEC LAW – The federal government will participate in a challenge of Quebec’s controversial religious symbols law, known as Bill 21, should the case end up at the Supreme Court, Justice Minister David Lametti said Wednesday, prompting swift pushback from Quebec’s Premier. Story here.
UN OFFICIAL TO INVESTIGATE INDIGENOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADA – United Nations special rapporteur is planning a Canadian trip to examine the “overall human-rights situation” of Indigenous people in light of the discoveries of possible unmarked graves near former residential schools. Story here.
MANURE PROTEST AT JOHN HORGAN’S CONSTITUENCY OFFICE – Police say they are investigating manure left at the front doors of Premier John Horgan’s local constituency office in Langford, B.C. Story here.
CANADA FUNDS PROBE OF SEX CRIMES BY RUSSIANS IN UKRAINE – Canada is committing an extra $1-million to help the international community investigate sex crimes by Russian troops in Ukraine. Story here.
CANADA NEEDS TO INCREASE MILITARY SPENDING: U.S. AMBASSADOR – The Liberals talked a bigger game than they delivered in the spring budget, America’s Ambassador David Cohen says, arguing Canada still needs to increase military spending to reflect current global realities. Story here from The National Post.
WESTERN PREMIERS MEETING ON FRIDAY – Canada’s Western premiers are meeting in Regina on Friday and federal health transfers are expected to be the top item on the list. The meeting was virtual in 2021. Story here from CBC.
ORDER OF CANADA FOR SINCLAIR – Murray Sinclair received the Order of Canada Thursday for dedicating his life to championing Indigenous Peoples’ rights and freedoms. Story here.
B.C. GOVERNMENT EXPLAINS PLANS FOR $789.5M MUSEUM – The B.C. government has presented a business case for a new Royal BC Museum, which shows the $789.5-million cost of building a new museum on the current site in Victoria would be lower than repairing or upgrading the existing facilities. Story here.
ONTARIO ELECTION – Doug Ford is the top choice in the Ontario election on pocketbook issues, according to a new poll that also shows a large majority of respondents are uncomfortable with building homes on farmland and green space as a way to bring down housing costs. Story here. Meanwhile, in ONTARIO ELECTION TODAY: Party leaders target key ridings and issues with June 2 vote just a week away. And you can subscribe here to Vote of Confidence, The Globe and Mail’s twice-weekly newsletter focused on the 2022 Ontario election.
CONSERVATIVE LEADERSHIP RACE.
FINAL SCHEDULED CONSERVATIVE LEADERSHIP DEBATE – Conservative leadership candidates attacked their opponents’ ethics during the only official French-language debate on Wednesday night, with Jean Charest, Pierre Poilievre and Patrick Brown highlighting past controversies, while also sparring over how to tackle the cost of living and protect the French language. Story here.
BROWN AND CHAREST DENY ANY AGREEMENT -Jean Charest and Patrick Brown say they are friends, but have no agreement to support each other’s campaigns in the Conservative leadership race.
Still, the pair have not been criticizing each other in the sometimes raucous debates among candidates seeking to lead the party.
The issue arose Wednesday night after the French-language leadership debate in Laval, Que. The former Quebec premier and Brampton, Ont., mayor were the only candidates, out of six, to meet with the media.
“We are friends. We have known each other for years. He came into politics with me when he was 15 years old,” Mr. Charest told journalists.
But Mr. Charest added, “There is no agreement among both camps, and he is campaigning very vigorously. I do not underestimate Patrick Brown.”
Mr. Brown declared there is no “gentleman’s agreement,” but that he has a friendship with Mr. Charest as with Leslyn Lewis, Roman Baber and Scott Aitchison.
He said he has differences of opinion with Pierre Poilievre, but has known him for awhile. Of his approach to the leadership race, Mr. Brown said the Ottawa MP is taking positions popular in some “corners of the country,” but added, “I think if Pierre Poilievre wins this leadership, we’ve already lost the next election.”
He noted that he was a volunteer for Mr. Charest in the 1995 Quebec referendum when Mr. Charest was Progressive Conservative leader. “Canadians owe him a debt of gratitude.”
THIS AND THAT
TODAY IN THE COMMONS – The House has adjourned until Monday, May 30.
NEW CLERK OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL – Janice Charette will take over as the Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet, effective Saturday, after more than a year holding the title, which includes being head of the federal public service, on an interim basis. Ms. Charette, formerly Canada’s high commissioner in the United Kingdom, replaces Ian Shugart, who has been on medical leave and is retiring. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced the news in a statement here and there’s information here on the role of the clerk, and those associated with the post.
NEW ROLE FOR MARK CARNEY – Former Bank of Canada governor Mark Carney has agreed to serve as the chair for a new advisory board of the Canada 2020 progressive think tank. The board will be focused on ambitious progressive public policy solutions as Canada looks ahead from the pandemic. Mr. Carney who was also governor of the Bank of England is also now serving as the United Nations Special Envoy for Climate Change and Finance, and vice chair of Brookfield Asset Management.
On Thursday’s edition of The Globe and Mail podcast, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist David Shribman discusses how America has come to find itself stuck in the intolerable position that has led to guns being the number one killer of Americans under the age of 20. The discussion comes as the United States is grappling with another mass shooting, with at least 19 children and two adults killed at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Tex., on Tuesday. This marks the 27th school shooting and the 213th mass shooting this year in the U.S. The Decibel is here.
PRIME MINISTER’S DAY
In Ottawa, the Prime Minister held private meetings and was scheduled to visit a local community service centre to meet with families impacted by the recent storm in the region, then visit a local grocery store in Quebec to meet with families affected by the storm. The Prime Minister was also scheduled to vote in the Ontario provincial election.
No schedules released for party leaders.
Campbell Clark (The Globe and Mail) on the Conservative leadership race: Jean Charest calls out Pierre Poilievre’s populism, but stopping him seems unlikely: “If there was a message Jean Charest wanted to get across, it was the one he left to the last minute of the last scheduled debate in the Conservative leadership campaign. Let’s call it his “Stop Pierre” speech. It was in what can be called Mr. Charest’s home turf, Laval, Que., in the French-language Conservative leadership debate. But it’s a good wager he’ll be repeating it in English, in other places. The dynamic is clear now: Pierre Poilievre is the front-runner, campaigning with a populist appeal, opposition to vaccine mandates, support for the trucker convoy and a pledge to fire “gatekeepers.” Mr. Charest is chasing.”
Andrew Coyne (The Globe and Mail) on how the paranoid style in Conservative politics has deep roots: “Populism has deep roots in the Conservative Party, at least since John Diefenbaker gathered the disparate populist movements that had sprung up in the West under the Progressive Conservative banner. As the party of the “outs,” those who for one reason or another were excluded from the Liberal power consensus, it has always tended to attract its share of cranks – not just populists but crackpots. What’s different today? Three things. One, the targets of populist wrath are increasingly external to Canada: bodies like the WEF or the WHO, whose remoteness from any actual role in controlling our lives only makes them seem more darkly potent, to those primed to believe it. Two, the “outs” no longer simply reject a particular political narrative, but increasingly science, and reason, and knowledge: the anti-expertise, anti-authority rages of people who have been “doing their own research.” And three, the crackpopulists used to be consigned to the party’s margins. Now they are contending to lead it.”
Robyn Urback (The Globe and Mail) on why Pierre Poilievre is right: Fire the gatekeepers, starting with the lifelong politicians: “The thing I like about Pierre Poilievre is that he says the things I’m thinking after I’ve stayed up all night drinking Red Bulls and watching Related Videos on YouTube. He will stand up to the Bill Gateses and Klaus Schwabs of the world, and ban ministers in his freest government ever from attending any World Economic Forum events (though they are still permitted to serve as his campaign co-chair). Mr. Poilievre understands the plight of the working man because he is the working man, with calluses on the sides of his pinkies where he rests his phone while texting. And really, is that so different from the hands of the truckers, the oil-rig workers, the brick masons he claims to represent? Are his Italian loafers so different from their steel-toe boots? Does his brow not bead with sweat after a hard day’s work when maintenance hasn’t gotten around to fixing the A/C?”
Konrad Yakabuski (The Globe and Mail) on Quebec’s Bill 96 being more of a paper tiger than an assault on English-language rights: “With the Quebec National Assembly’s adoption this week of Bill 96, which aims to strengthen protection for the French language in Quebec, Mr. Legault has again thrown anglophone voters under the bus to bolster his nationalist credentials in advance of the election. While the new language law overreaches in several ways, particularly in pre-emptively invoking the notwithstanding clause and allowing for warrantless searches by the language police, it is not the existential threat that some English-speaking critics make it out to be. It may in fact prove to be more of a paper tiger than a law with teeth. The CAQ’s bark is worse than its bite, and the new law is likely to end up being engulfed in its own contradictions.”
Lisa Van Dusen (Policy Magazine) on how there are moments when it’s hard to fathom that Pierre Poilievre and Jean Charest are vying to lead the same party: “Watching the French debate as I write this, that’s the tension on display beneath the bouts of incoherent brawling, some of it in French dubbed “pénible” (painful) by Radio-Canada (except for Poilievre, who almost makes up for in fluency what he lacks in assonance, and Charest, who is bilingual/bicultural, accent-less in both languages). Charest is a serious politician with serious experience who finds himself vying to lead an entity that may or may not be willing to follow him. Poilievre is a canny chancer peddling an assortment of emotionally charged keywords, some of which are attached to ideas, others to fears and still others to threats. Which may be precisely what this Conservative Party of Canada wants.”
Police investigating threatening social media post captured near Pointe-Claire school – CTV News Montreal
Warriors top Mavs in Game 5, advance to NBA Finals – TSN
Nunavut admits to large tuberculosis outbreak in Pangnirtung months later – The Globe and Mail
Silver investment demand jumped 12% in 2019
Europe kicks off vaccination programs | All media content | DW | 27.12.2020 – Deutsche Welle
Global Media Markets, 2015-2020, 2020-2025F, 2030F – TV and Radio Broadcasting, Film and Music, Information Services, Web Content, Search Portals And Social Media, Print Media, & Cable – GlobeNewswire
Health20 hours ago
Montreal sauna suspected origin of Canada’s monkeypox outbreak: doctors – Global News
News19 hours ago
Monkeypox: 26 cases now confirmed in Canada – CTV News
Health8 hours ago
Monkeypox: Canada likely to see more cases – CTV News
News20 hours ago
Canada Soccer cancels controversial exhibition game against Iran – CBC News
Health19 hours ago
Medical Officer of Health gives monkeypox update – North Bay News – BayToday.ca
Media20 hours ago
Amherstburg man shares EV car experience on social media | CTV News – CTV News Windsor
Art21 hours ago
Downtown Art Alley unveiled – Windsor Star
Tech19 hours ago
PS4 Sold 6 Units A Minute, PS5 Is Selling Nearly 1,000 – Forbes