Connect with us

Politics

Tribune Editorial: Bad science meets worse politics – Salt Lake Tribune

Published

on


Exactly how and why did Utah make a play to become the hydroxychloroquine capital of the United States? We need answers.

As the federal government sputtered a month ago and states began a free-for-all for masks and ventilators, Utah apparently decided to stake its claim on hydroxychloroquine, a malaria and lupus treatment which some doctors were trying on covid-19 patients.

In a move Gov. Gary Herbert now says he knew nothing about, the state of Utah made a deal with a Utah pharmacist to buy $800,000 worth of hydroxychloroquine — apparently just to hoard. It was never more than a questionable covid-19 treatment, and Utahns were never at risk of running out of it. But that didn’t stop state officials from making a purchase that far exceeded any known need in the state.

At the same time President Trump was overriding his medical advisers to promote hydroxychloroquine, the push in Utah was spearheaded by Senate President Stuart Adams, an honorary Utah co-chairman of Trump’s re-election campaign. On March 20, Adams threw a press conference at the State Capitol to promote the drug, and he included Dan Richards, the CEO of Meds In Motion, a Utah online pharmacist that happened to be sitting on a pile of the stuff.

Eleven days later, the state signed the $800,000 deal with Meds in Motion.

The weeks since have been a harsh reality for hydroxychloroquine’s proponents. A Veterans Administration study found those receiving it were dying at a higher rate than those who didn’t. The American Medical Association and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control have now recommended against using it as a covid treatment, noting that it’s effectiveness is questionable but its risk is apparent. That’s on top of the fact that heavy use could deny medicine to lupus patients and others who actually do benefit from it.

The relationship between Adams and Meds in Motion deserves a hard look, but it took more than Adams to turn this into a fiasco. Who else was involved in the decision?

Herbert says he didn’t know anything about it, but it was an executive agency, the Governor’s Office of Management and Budget, that authorized the deal. How did the chief executive, one who presumably is involved in daily briefings on virus response, not know? Why would his budget office do this without at least some signal from the boss? They don’t work for Adams. They work for Herbert.

But then they found that the app was used to raise hydroxychloroquine awareness by including questions about it even though it’s a completely unproven treatment. What’s that about? Well, one of the executives running TestUtah, Mark Newman, also sits on Meds in Motion’s board.

Utah’s response to this crisis should be a proud moment. Our health care professionals have risen to the occasion, and the vast majority of Utahns are safely distancing. But state political leaders have given money and license to shameless promoters of baseless medical claims. We also have a lot of chlorine in our salt flats. Anyone want to get in on this bleach-drinking thing?

Wasted money aside, the real damage here is the blot it leaves on the truly outstanding medical science that goes on in this state. Don’t think this won’t affect recruiting at the University of Utah, which competes for research talent with the top schools in the nation. At a time when we have to dig out from economic collapse, we’ve tied a weight to what is arguably the state’s premier entrepreneurial engine.

For Herbert, he’s in that political hard place. He could admit knowledge and be part of it, or he could admit ignorance and be out of touch. He chose the latter, but that can’t be the last word.

The hydroxychloroquine saga is deeply offensive in multiple ways, and it deserves a complete, transparent and independent investigation. The roots of this debacle must be exposed so that it never happens again.

Correction: The state agency authorizing the $800,000 purchase of hydroxychloroquine in March was the Governor’s Office of Management and Budget. A Wednesday editorial incorrectly identified the authorizing agency as the Utah Department of Health.

Let’s block ads! (Why?)



Source link

Politics

Political and General News Events from June 2 – National Post

Published

on


June 2 (Reuters) –

For other diaries, please see:

Political and General News

Top Economic Events

Emerging Markets Economic Events

Government Debt Auctions

U.S. Federal Reserve

Today in Washington

—————————————————————- This diary is filed daily. ** Indicates new events —————————————————————-

TUESDAY, JUNE 2

** TALLINN – Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz will visit Tallinn and meet with his counterparts from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. ** BUDAPEST- Slovak Foreign Minister Ivan Korcok and Hungarian counterpart Peter Szijjárto meet in Budapest to discuss easing border restrictions in the region and also in the European Union. ** LONDON – British Prime Minister Boris Johnson holds a cabinet meeting of his top ministers, a day after introducing new measures to relax a stringent lockdown. ** BERLIN – German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas receives Ukraine counterpart Kuyleba Dmytro in Berlin – 1000 GMT. ** LONDON- British Health Secretary Matt Hancock updates lawmakers on the UK’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic – 1130 GMT.

** MADRID – Spain’s economy minister Calvino to participate at session in senate – 1400 GMT.

BERLIN – German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and his Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba speak to reporters on the sidelines of a joint meeting. GREECE – Greek, Israeli and Cypriot energy ministers speak at a virtual conference on their energy partnership and its role in regional energy security and economic cooperation in the age of COVID-19. BRUSSELS – The European Commission’s top economy official, Valdis Dombrovskis, and France’s EU affairs minister, Amelie de Montchalin, discuss the proposed 750 billion euro economic stimulus plan on a webinar – 1400 GMT. BERLIN – Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and presidential office head Andriy Yermak will pay a visit to Berlin.

– – – – – – – – –

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3

** ATHENS – Greece Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis will meet President of the Hellenic Republic Katerina Sakellaropoulou at the Presidential Mansion – 1500 GMT.

** WASHINGTON DC – U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin holds call with G7 finance ministers. ** WASHINGTON DC – International Monetary Fund Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva takes part in online forum – 1800 GMT. ** MOSCOW – WHO Regional Director for Europe Hans Kluge is to brief online Russian language media on COVID-19 – 1000 GMT. ** ROME – Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio meets French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian in Rome and hold joint news conference – 1600 GMT.

LONDON- UK financial services minister John Glen speaks on government priorities for recovery following COVID-19 at investment webinar – 0830 GMT. PRAGUE – Slovakia’s new Prime Minister Igor Matovic visits Prague to meet his counterpart Andrej Babis and other officials.

BRUSSELS – The European Commission’s climate chief, Frans Timmermans, presents an assessment of the EU member states’ national energy and climate plans.

– – – – – – – – – THURSDAY, JUNE 4

** MADRID – Spain’s economy minister Nadia Calvino to participate in online economy forum – 0700 GMT. ** MADRID – The President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, participates in “Nueva Economia Forum” online meeting – 0900 GMT. ** WASHINGTON DC – IMF spokesman Gerry Rice holds regular briefing to discuss global economy and the impact of the COVID-19pandemic on emerging market and developing countries – 1430 GMT. CHILE – 9th anniversary of Chile’s Puyehue volcano eruption, causing air traffic cancellations across South America, New Zealand, Australia.

HONG KONG – Tens of thousands attend a candlelight vigil in Hong Kong to commemorate the 31st anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown in Beijing.

BRUSSELS – Video conference of EU ministers of justice

BRUSSELS – Video conference of EU transport ministers – – – – – – – – – FRIDAY, JUNE 5

GREECE – The Economist holds conference entitled “Euro zone’s quest for a coronavirus vaccine.” Eurogroup’s head Mario Centeno, EU Commission’s Executive Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis, Greek Finance Minister Christos Staikouras and Piraeus Bank Chief Executive Officer Christos Megalou will speak – 1430 GMT.

GLOBAL – World Environment Day.

SAINT KITTS and NEVIS – Kittitian and Nevisian National Assembly election. – – – – – – – – –

SATURDAY, JUNE 6

LJUBLJANA – Italian foreign minister Luigi di Maio visits Slovenia.

SEOUL – South Korea marks the 65th anniversary of Memorial Day. – – – – – – – – –

MONDAY, JUNE 8 BRUSSELS – European foreign affairs minister meet in Brussels. – – – – – – – – –

TUESDAY, JUNE 9

VIENNA – 179th Meeting of the OPEC Conference via video conference.

– – – – – – – – –

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 10

VIENNA – 11th OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting via video conference.

– – – – – – – – – THURSDAY, JUNE 11

DODOMA – Tanzania finance minister presents 2020/21 fiscal budget to parliament

NAIROBI – Kenya’s Finance Minister is scheduled to present the government’s budget for the 2020/21 fiscal year to parliament – 1200 GMT FREDRICK COUNTY, MARYLAND, U.S. – U.S. President Donald Trump hosts G7 leaders at Camp David (to June 12).

LUXEMBOURG – Eurogroup meeting. – – – – – – – – –

FRIDAY, JUNE 12

GLOBAL – World Day against Child Labour. – – – – – – – – –

SUNDAY, JUNE 14

GLOBAL – World Blood Donor Day.

GAZA – 13th anniversary of Hamas takeover of the Gaza strip from Fatah. – – – – – – – – –

MONDAY, JUNE 15 GLOBAL – World Elder Abuse Awareness Day (WEAAD). BRUSSELS – EU-UK officials meet to assess progress in Brexit talks ahead of EU summit

– – – – – – – – –

WENDESDAY, JUNE 17

GLOBAL – United Nation’s World Day to Combat Desertification and Drought. MOSCOW – Russian Energy minister Alexander Valentinovich Novak attends a conference on COVID-19 and the future of energy sector. – – – – – – – – –

THURSDAY, JUNE 18

BRUSSELS – European Council meeting (to June 19).

– – – – – – – – –

SATURDAY, JUNE 20

GLOBAL – World Refugee Day. Sri Lanka – Sri Lankan Parliament election. – – – – – – – – –

TUESDAY, JUNE 23 KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia – APEC finance senior officials’ meeting (to June 25). – – – – – – – – –

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24 BERLIN – 72nd anniversary of beginning of The Berlin Blockade. Communist forces cut off all land and water routes between West Germany and West Berlin, prompting the United States to organize a massive airlift.

MOSCOW – Abkhazia’s President Aslan Bzhania will attend Moscow’s Victory Day parade, rescheduled by Russian President Vladimir Putin for June 24

CHISINAU – Moldovan President Igor Dodon will attend a military parade commemorating the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory in the Great Patriotic War. BRUSSELS – Vice president of the EU Commission, Frans Timmermans, presents the bloc’s smart sector integration.

Mongolia – Mongolian State Great Hural Election. – – – – – – – – –

THURSDAY, JUNE 25

LOS ANGELES – 11th death anniversary of pop star Michael Jackson. – – – – – – – – – FRIDAY, JUNE 26

GLOBAL – International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. – – – – – – – – –

SATURDAY, JUNE 27 Iceland – President election. – – – – – – – – –

MONDAY, JUNE 29 PYEONGTAEK – South Korea observes the 18th anniversary of an inter-Korean sea clash.

BEJING/TAIPEI – 10th Anniversary of signing of a landmark trade deal between China and Taiwan.

LUXEMBOURG – European ministers for agriculture and fisheries meet for talks. (to June 30). – – – – – – – – –

SUNDAY, JULY 5

Dominican Republic – Chamber of Deputies election. Dominican Republic – Senate election. Dominican Republic – President election.

– – – – – – – – –

TUESDAY, JULY 7

Malawi – President’s election. – – – – – – – – –

SATURDAY, JULY 18 RIYADH – Saudi Arabia hosts third meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in Riyadh.(to July 19).

– – – – – – – – – TUESDAY, JULY 21

SAINT PETERSBURG, Russia – Russia hosts SCO and BRICS summits (to July 23). – – – – – – – – –

MONDAY, JULY 27 MANILA – Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte delivers State of the Nation address.

FRIDAY, July 31

VALPARAISO, Chile – Chile’s President Sebastian Pinera delivers the annual state of the nation address.

HANOI – Vietnam host 53rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Related Meetings (to August 5).

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – NOTE: The inclusion of diary items does not necessarily mean that Reuters will file a story based on the event.

For Technical Issues Please contact Thomson Reuters Customer Support (TRCS) at https://customers.reuters.com/kccontactus/telephone.aspx

Let’s block ads! (Why?)



Source link

Continue Reading

Politics

How TikTok got political – The Conversation UK

Published

on


TikTok, the viral video sharing platform, has been one of the biggest hits of lockdown. Content that originated on the app, like nurses dancing in UK hospitals, has jumped to mainstream TV coverage. TikTok even put its first ad on UK television, made in isolation.

TikTok’s user base has grown rapidly over the lockdown period, with 315 million downloads in the first quarter of 2020. It is not difficult to see why it has found its lockdown niche: the infinite scroll of content there is addictive and less stressful than news-driven platforms.

TikTok videos are usually made at home, and so creators are not at a disadvantage despite their humdrum surroundings. This is in contrast to platforms like Instagram, which has become a showcase for travel, glamour and live events.

The primary uses of TikTok are for viral dances, comedy challenges and demonstrations of visual flair such as makeup and cosplay memes, but recently there has been increased political content. This is something I have been looking into as part of my research examining the intersections between politics, fandom and internet cultures.

TikTok trends

Political activists adapt existing TikTok memes and trends. Dances and lipsyncs are set to political speeches, and challenges used to make political points. Producers of political content on TikTok skew younger than those on other social media, which matches the creator base and audience profiles.

Individuals are more popular than party political branded accounts, partly because official accounts feature mostly repurposed video which has been shot horizontally for other platforms. This looks out of place on Tiktok, which presents video vertically.




Read more:
The secret of TikTok’s success? Humans are wired to love imitating dance moves


What works well is organic content made on and for the app. TikTok has its own more intimate feel: videos have a homemade, spontaneous quality. A teenage Boris Johnson fan, posting videos of himself at home, has racked up thousands of views.

One young Labour activist has made TikTok videos with MPs in Parliament. Until recently the daughter of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Michael Gove, had an account, and his supporters and opponents followed her hoping for insight into their family life.

The style of political content on Tiktok owes much to the more open expression of fan culture in politics over the past few years. While fans have existed in politics for as long as politicians have been celebrities, it has become normalised to wear your political heart on your sleeve.

From hashtags and fan videos to homemade placards and t-shirts, fan culture celebrating individual politicians is here to stay. Neighbours of Dominic Cummings, the UK prime minister’s senior strategist, have been sharing the anti-fan activity on their street.

BackBoris and BooForBoris hashtags are popular. Videos declaring support for or against the US president Donald Trump are common both in the US and UK. During my research, I have seen everything from fancams (video compilations of an individual) dedicated to Labour party leader Keir Starmer to a Michael Gove cosplayer.

Online community

Activists are able to not just exploit virality but find community by using the same song, audio clip, filter, dance or challenge. Hashtags are less important now on text-dominated platforms and more so on visual ones like Instagram, YouTube and TikTok. The app is driven by trends, memes, challenges and recommendations.

The speed of turning a lip sync to a song into a 15-second funny clip while sat on your sofa enables political comedy of a kind we haven’t seen before. Replying to comments or other videos with new videos, or splitting the screen between the previous video and the reply as “duets” allows for disagreements and debates.

Creators who are underrepresented on other platforms due to race, disability and class can speak to their peers directly. The killing of George Floyd by white police officers and the response from the Black Lives Matter movement has seen an explosion of content on the platform. TikTok has been criticised, though, for excluding black and less conventionally attractive creators from the app’s For You landing page, limiting their reach.

In the future, it is likely that more young politicians will produce their own content for or inspired by the platform. Interactions on social networking services have been said to improve young people’s perception of the likeability of political candidates and their trust in government.

The playful, funny interactions on TikTok may have potential for good as well as harm for the public sphere, if politicians and their fans can strike the right tone.

Let’s block ads! (Why?)



Source link

Continue Reading

Politics

The Troubling Origins of Birthright Politics – The Nation

Published

on


18th century print of the expulsion of Jews from Spain. (Fototeca Gilardi / Getty Images)

Birthright citizenship is the foundation of American democracy. The birthright principle, rooted in common law and the Reconstruction era’s 14th Amendment, guarantees citizenship to the children of US citizens and to everyone born within the country’s borders. The grant of citizenship at birth has a powerful egalitarian effect, making every American—at least in theory—an equal stakeholder in the political community. Yet it brings about this desirable result through what can only be described as arbitrary means. One inherits citizenship from one’s parents or acquires it based on the happenstance of one’s place of birth. Our democracy of equal-born citizens is therefore built on a fundamental inequality: the unearned privilege of winning what the scholar Ayelet Shachar has called “the birthright lottery.”

Two recent histories explain how the illiberal birthright principle has become so fundamental to modern democracies. In Race Is About Politics, the French historian Jean-Frédéric Schaub offers an elegant and polemical account of how the idea of racial difference, first crafted in medieval Spain, grew into a defining form of political otherness. Birthright Citizens, the most recent book by the prominent historian of law and race Martha S. Jones, gives us a closer look at how this process unfolded in the United States. Taking us through the streets and into the courthouses of 19th century Baltimore, Jones shows us how free African Americans asserted their citizenship as a birthright in order to counter the hereditary logic of race and, in so doing, helped lay the groundwork for the 14th Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship to all those born on US soil.

Taken together, Race Is About Politics and Birthright Citizens show the power as well as the limits of birthright politics—how it can be a vehicle for liberation and equality and how it can serve the cause of racial and ethnic exclusion. Both books acknowledge the potential of birthright politics to generate inclusive and equal citizenship. They also show that beneath its surface, currents of inequality persist that can make it a treacherous medium for creating a more just society.

Birthright has been part of political life at least since Jacob bought the blessings of the firstborn from his brother, Esau. From the ancient world through the early modern era, birth determined one’s station in life. Born a king or a nobleman, one had rights and duties that a commoner would never have. One’s place of birth mattered, too: The native sons of a city had privileges denied to the peasants born a stone’s throw outside its walls. However, in practice, the premodern world was more socially and politically dynamic than the theory might suggest. Commoners could become noblemen—kings, even—and nobles could fall into a penury little different from that of the peasantry. But the principle of birthright remained the rule. A natural-born subject, wrote the English jurist William Blackstone in 1765, owed a “perpetual” allegiance to his sovereign from the moment of his birth, one that could never be “forfeited, cancelled, or altered.”

Starting in the mid-15th century, birthright politics took on a new form: the notion of race. As Schaub observes early in his book, the history of race is often flattened into a timeless and universal practice of differentiation based on how people look. But the idea of race, he insists, began as something else. It was not about appearance at all; in fact, early racial thought differentiated among groups that looked alike. Race was an ideology that sought to draw boundaries of political community through genealogy and birthright. By “naturaliz[ing]” forms of “sociopolitical difference,” it applied a new and pernicious patina to the age-old practice of inherited political status.

To make his argument, Schaub retells the story of the racialization of Jews in the Iberian Peninsula—which he sees as a key passage in the development of both racial thought and modern birthright politics. Starting in the eighth century, most of Iberia fell under the rule of a succession of Muslim states, which were content to let the region’s large Jewish population exist in relative peace and autonomy. But as Christian kingdoms gradually conquered the peninsula during the Middle Ages, they and the Catholic Church sought to enforce religious conformity on their newly acquired lands. Jews were massacred or subjected to mass forced conversions. In 1492 the “Catholic Monarchs” Ferdinand and Isabella of Aragon and Castile completed the conquest and brought this process to its conclusion, forcing all of the remaining Jews to convert to Catholicism or leave.

Yet even as they were stamping out the last pockets of Judaism in Iberia, Spain’s Old Christians, jealous of the social and political power they might lose to the new converts, were finding ways to perpetuate their outsider status. By the 1440s, Old Christians had formalized in law an early form of racial ideology that rested on a distinction between two kinds of otherness: Jewish belief and Jewishness. The Jewish faith could be washed away at the baptismal font. But Jewishness was something else altogether—a form of genealogical inferiority embedded in Jewish bodies. It passed from one generation to the next, and it was unalterable. Jews were a different people as well as a different faith. Although they could convert, they would retain their racial otherness (which was also invisible, since the conversos looked just like the Old Christians).

In the decades after their first contact with the Americas in 1492, Iberians and other Europeans carried this emerging racial ideology around the globe, creating an expansive portfolio of racializing theories to mark off many other groups as permanent outsiders. They increasingly imagined Native Americans and sub-Saharan Africans as distinct races, granting themselves license to take their lands and reduce their people to serfdom or slavery. Unlike the conversos, many of these populations had physical features, especially skin color, that created visible forms of distinction between them and Europeans. Though Europeans used these features to identify the members of the various “races,” their fundamental difference, they insisted, was genealogical—an inheritance from birth, as with the Jews of Iberia.

The racialization of non-Europeans in the Americas and Africa thus became an essential part of European efforts to draw lines of political exclusion within and around their empires, putting millions of people outside the circle of citizenship and, in some cases, outside the circle of humanity itself. Unlike other forms of identity and political membership, this birthright politics enfolded many Europeans, including women and even members of other religious groups, as natural-born members of a racial community. But it excluded many others and insisted that belonging was an immutable fact, lodging racial otherness in the body and making the boundaries between in-groups and out-groups permanent and unalterable.

This racialized logic of birthright, as Schaub observes, has remained latent in Western politics ever since, wielded by dominant groups over and over again as a way to slow down or stop the social and political ascent of subordinated communities.

When the United States emerged as an independent nation, it seemed to promise at least a partial break from the idea that political belonging should be the result of birth alone. Starting with their 1776 decision to disavow the British monarch, American revolutionaries insisted that theirs was a community of citizens who freely chose to be part of the nation. Their actions in subsequent decades gave some substance to those claims. The 1790 Naturalization Act, the new nation’s first immigration law, let any free white person enter the country and become an American citizen more or less at will. Some US politicians even seemed inclined to accept the claim that citizens could expatriate themselves—that is, give up their citizenship. In 1795, Supreme Court Justice James Iredell even ruminated about whether expatriation was a “natural, inalienable right” that could not be limited or regulated by the state.

Yet status by birth entrenched itself in the politics of the new republic as well. A few exceptions aside, the nation’s founders embraced a birthright notion of race not unlike that of the Spanish—which they then used to justify slavery and the denial of rights and citizenship to nonwhite people living in US territories. At the time of the American Revolution, roughly one out of every six inhabitants of the American colonies was an enslaved African. White Americans justified their status on the grounds that Africans were members of a different and inferior race, whose stain passed from generation to generation.

Members of the founding generation, eager to expand the white population of their new country, took an equally expansive view of the birthright principle’s application to members of their racial group. David Ramsay, a South Carolina congressman and early theorist of US citizenship, believed that American citizens “transmitted” their citizenship to their children “by inheritance.” Before long, judges and legislators had extended this potent principle of hereditary citizenship to include any white person born to US citizens abroad and to white people born to noncitizens on American soil.

In Birthright Citizens, Jones explores how a small but significant free African American community tried to turn the young republic’s birthright politics on its head, transforming a doctrine of exclusion and hierarchy into a means by which they could claim a place for themselves in American society. Free African Americans, like many people of color in the Atlantic world, were relentlessly pursued by the possibility that their race, not their status as free people, was their true birthright. The risks of exclusion or expulsion and the nightmare of reenslavement were a constant presence in their lives. Claiming American citizenship as an inalienable birthright was a crucial way for free African Americans to overcome these dangers—and, Jones argues, their claims had a lasting impact on the nature of citizenship for all Americans.

Baltimore was a center of these efforts by free African Americans to assert their inborn right to US citizenship, and Jones focuses her narrative on their story. As members of an old and relatively wealthy community, Baltimore’s African Americans were well equipped to use the city’s courts as a forum for demonstrating their citizenship by exercising the rights of free people. They sued fellow Baltimoreans of both races over matters great and small, from a debt of a few tens of dollars to control of a prosperous Methodist church and its property. These suits protected their property, but they also had symbolic value: Even an unsuccessful suit affirmed a litigant’s status as a legal person. While in court, black litigants could, as Jones put it, become “peers to their white counterparts.” And the act of going to court, repeated year in and year out, could be used to make claims, however tenuous, about citizenship and equality.

But exercising one’s rights in court proved to be a weak guarantor of African American citizenship. Throughout the antebellum period, in Baltimore and elsewhere, white legislators and jurists worked to reduce African Americans to the status of “denizens,” a category in English common law for individuals who were designated neither native nor foreign and occupied a middle ground between full membership and full exclusion. In Maryland alone, the state legislature heaped on law after law that sought to impose this second-class status on black people in the state. African Americans could not freely or easily leave the state, they could not vote, and they faced restrictions on owning firearms (though in practice, white judges in Baltimore routinely granted gun licenses to black men). African American citizenship, in short, was perpetually under assault.

Starting in the 1820s, Baltimore’s African Americans found their citizenship status threatened in a new and frightening way by the so-called colonization movement. Colonization was a project, led by white Americans, that sought to empty the country of free people of color. Most proponents of colonization did not envision forcibly expelling free people of color but wanted them to leave of their own volition. Yet even if it was not backed by a threat of force, colonization posed an existential threat to African American citizenship: All such projects rested on the assumption that the true home of African Americans was somewhere else. When coupled with measures designed to make life in the United States difficult for free people of color, as it often was, colonization took on the sinister, coercive overtones of ethnic cleansing.

To counter the threat of colonization and other efforts to reduce them to the status of denizens, black Baltimoreans and their allies began to declare their citizenship an inalienable birthright. “We are Americans, having a birthright citizenship,” wrote the Pennsylvanian African American leader Martin Delany in 1852, and activists in Baltimore transformed this claim into their political creed. Inalienable citizenship was defined by the same birthbound language that was used to exclude them. In 1831, Baltimore’s leading black citizens issued a declaration proclaiming themselves natives of the “land in which we were born” and insisting that it was thus their “true and appropriate home.” William Yates, a white activist whom Jones discusses at length, expanded on this notion in an 1838 treatise. Free people of color, he argued, were undoubtedly citizens because they were “natives of the country.”

These claims by black Baltimoreans began to resound forcefully beyond the city’s borders in the run-up to the Civil War. The most striking illustration of their reach, curiously enough, came from the pen of a famous opponent of black citizenship, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Roger B. Taney. As a son of the city and a leading Maryland politician before joining the court, he was intimately familiar with the black Baltimoreans and their claims to US citizenship. Both were clearly on his mind in 1857 when he authored the court’s notorious opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford, an appeal of a freedom suit brought by an enslaved man from the Midwest. Going well beyond what was necessary to resolve the case presented to the court, Taney decided to use it as an opportunity to pronounce against African Americans’ aspirations to citizenship in general. His opinion provided a decisive rebuff to black Baltimoreans’ claims. African Americans, he baldly declared, were “not citizens.” The “unhappy black race,” he continued (in language that closely echoed the Iberians’ more than four centuries earlier), “were separated from the white by indelible marks.”

Jones’s book closes with a brief discussion of Reconstruction, which gives a tantalizing glimpse of the connections between African American claims to birthright citizenship in the antebellum period and the arguments about it after the Civil War that culminated in the 14th Amendment. The aftermath of the war saw a final struggle, played out across the country, to remove the persistent doubts about the citizenship status of former enslaved people and freeborn African Americans alike. The 14th Amendment, adopted in 1868, aimed to remove all ambiguity on this point by constitutionalizing the very principle of birthright citizenship that activists for African American rights had been hammering home for decades. “All persons born…in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” the amendment states, “are citizens of the United States.” By the time this language was adopted, black Baltimoreans were no longer prophets in the wilderness: The idea of citizenship for African Americans had gained substantial acceptance in the North. But they were surely gratified to find their argument set, at long last, into the US Constitution.

In the century and a half since its ratification, the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment has been without doubt a force for good, a powerful instrument for unambiguously confirming membership in the American nation. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in the face of virulent anti-Chinese racism, the clause guaranteed the citizenship of individuals born to Chinese parents on US soil. It did likewise for the children of Eastern and Southern European immigrants who came to the United States in the early 20th century, and in more recent times, it has extended citizenship to the American-born children of undocumented immigrants from Latin America and other regions.

Yet as Schaub’s historical genealogy of racial thought reminds us, there is a flip side to this coin. Like the idea of race to which it is sometimes opposed, the birthright principle works through inheritance, passing status from parent to child as if it were an innate quality in a bloodline. It can also confer the same status based on the accident of where one is born. In either case, the birthright principle distributes citizenship’s privileges and blessings by chance rather than in accordance with any higher principle of justice. In practice, this means equality for some is bought at the price of arbitrary exclusion for many.

For much of the recent past, Americans have uncritically accepted the bargain we have struck between these two faces of the birthright principle. The benefits of inclusion have seemed to far outweigh its exclusionary, illiberal mechanism for deciding who is in and who is out. But in our age of global inequality, it is clear the arbitrary belonging created by birthright politics is no longer adequate to our moment. Globally, the distribution of wealth among the world’s countries has reached unprecedented levels of inequality and continues to grow more extreme. The negative externalities of runaway consumption, above all climate change and its effects, are falling hardest on the countries and peoples least able to bear the burden. Infectious diseases—of which the novel coronavirus is just the latest arrival—kill millions of people in poorer countries as the citizens of the richest nations shut their gates and hoard medicine and supplies. How is it even remotely fair to allocate citizenship in the world’s nations by mere random chance when so much depends on which ticket one draws?

Rethinking the politics of birthright will not be easy. The roots of birthright belonging extend deep into the soil of the American political tradition. And as Schaub and Jones remind us, over the past two centuries we have gained a great deal, in terms of equality and inclusion, from the audacious grafting of democratic institutions onto a political community defined by birthright. But as the modern world of nation-states enters its third century and perhaps comes to its crisis, we will have to take a hard look at the birthright principle and decide if it is still right—if, indeed, we can still accept it. Should birth alone dictate so much about who we are?

Let’s block ads! (Why?)



Source link

Continue Reading

Trending