Opinion
Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act, 2026, should not leave the Senate in its current form. It gives police and Canada’s spy service new, faster ways to learn who is behind a phone number or an online account, and it does so without the safeguards Parliament wrote for journalists and their confidential sources less than a decade ago. Senators studying the bill now have the last clear chance to fix that.
Start with what the bill actually does. The version the House of Commons passed on June 18 creates a “confirmation of service demand.” Under the new section 487.0121 of the Criminal Code, a police officer, without going to a judge, can order a telephone or internet company to say whether it serves a particular subscriber, account or identifier. The officer needs only “reasonable grounds to suspect” an offence, and can bar the company from revealing the demand “for a period not greater than one year.” A parallel power for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, in a new section 20.22 of the CSIS Act, sets no time limit at all in its non-disclosure clause.
The bill also creates a new court order for subscriber information, the name, address and other details that tie a person to an account, at the same “reasonable grounds to suspect” standard. Part 2 lets the government require telecom companies to keep “categories of metadata” for up to six months, and lets the public safety minister issue orders to electronic service providers that the companies are forbidden to disclose. The government’s own explainer of the bill’s tools is on the Justice Department website, and our plain-language guide to what the bill does walks through each part.
Here is the problem for investigative journalism. In 2016, La Presse columnist Patrick Lagacé learned that Montreal police had obtained 24 court-authorized warrants to surveil his phone, giving them access to his call register and his location, while hunting for an officer suspected of leaking to reporters, the Committee to Protect Journalists reported. Police were not after his stories. They were after his sources, and the record of who contacted him was enough.
Parliament responded in 2017 with the Journalistic Sources Protection Act. Among other things, it added section 488.01 to the Criminal Code. When police know a warrant or production order relates to a journalist, they must go to a superior court judge, who may grant it only if there is no other reasonable way to get the information and the public interest in the investigation outweighs the journalist’s right to privacy in gathering news.
A confirmation of service demand never goes before a judge, so that test can never apply. That is a quiet but serious gap. The first step in unmasking a source is usually the most basic one: which company serves the number that called the newsroom. The bill hands that step to an officer acting alone, under a gag order.
The drafters knew how to protect sensitive relationships when they wanted to. Section 487.0121(3) says a demand “must not be made” if it would disclose medical information or information covered by solicitor-client privilege. The same carve-out appears in the CSIS version. Journalistic sources, which Parliament protected by statute in 2017, are not on the list. Whether the 2017 safeguards even reach the new subscriber information order, numbered 487.0142, depends on how a court reads a range of section numbers written before the order existed. A free press should not hang on that kind of technicality.
The metadata provision makes the risk larger. The Lagacé case was about metadata: who called, and when. A rule that makes companies keep that record for everyone, for months, builds the very map an investigator needs to trace a reporter’s contacts. University of Ottawa law professor Michael Geist told senators on Nov. 16 that the retention regime remains “constitutionally vulnerable with little evidence of its necessity,” The Canadian Press reported. He said police already have targeted preservation and production orders with judicial oversight, and proposed 30 days if retention stays at all. Tamir Israel of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association told the same hearing the bill “effectively grants the government a blank cheque” to impose surveillance demands on providers in secret.
Journalists have said this plainly. In a June 3 submission to the Commons public safety committee, the Canadian Association of Journalists wrote that it “strongly opposes Bill C-22 in its current form due to unacceptable risks.” It warned that the consequences fall hardest on journalists, vulnerable sources and whistleblowers, and pointed to Australia, where police unlawfully accessed retained metadata, including in cases involving journalists. The association also noted Signal’s warning that it would rather leave Canada than weaken its privacy promises, a threat the company repeated this fall. Encrypted apps are how many reporters now talk to people who could lose their jobs, or worse, for speaking.
The government’s case deserves a fair hearing. Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree said when he introduced the bill that “Canada needs laws that are adapted to the technological world we live in, and the way criminals exploit it,” according to his department’s release. Child exploitation and organized crime move fast online, and Canada’s allies in the Five Eyes already have lawful access regimes. Ottawa also made real changes: it agreed to cut metadata retention from one year to six months, and the Commons committee added a safeguard so companies cannot be forced to build systemic vulnerabilities into their services. Earlier this month, the minister told senators the bill “is not about surveillance.”
None of that answers the press freedom gap. The Justice Department’s Charter statement discusses freedom of expression only in relation to the gag on service providers. It does not address journalists or their sources. Adding them to the existing carve-out would cost police nothing they need: an officer with a real case against a source could still go to a superior court judge under section 488.01, as the law already requires for warrants.
Others who back lawful access in principle have flagged related flaws. Privacy Commissioner Philippe Dufresne told the Senate committee on Nov. 2 that the definition of subscriber information is broad compared with the low threshold, and asked that it be narrowed to a finite list of identifiers. The Canadian Bar Association called the one-year gag on demands excessive and proposed 90 days, with a judge approving any extension.
The Senate national security committee, which received the bill on Oct. 22, should make four changes. Add journalistic sources to the carve-outs in section 487.0121(3) and the CSIS demand. State in the bill that section 488.01 applies to the new subscriber information order and to requests to foreign providers. Cut metadata retention to 30 days, or drop it. Cap gag orders at 90 days unless a judge extends them, and require yearly public counts of demands. Before it votes, the committee should also hear directly from the Canadian Association of Journalists and press freedom groups. Police can have modern tools. They should not get a shortcut around the rule that protects the people who tell the public what those in power want hidden.
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